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Abstract: This paper examines Geoff Hodgson’s interpretation of Veblen in agency-structure 
terms, and argues it produces a conception of reflexive economic agents.  It then sets out an 
account of cumulative causation processes using this reflexive agent conception, modeling 
them as a two-part causal process, one part involving a linear causal relation and one part 
involving a circular causal relation.  The paper compares the reflexive agent conception to the 
standard expected utility conception of economic agents, and argues that on a cumulative 
causation view of the world the completeness assumption essential to the standard view of 
rationality cannot be applied.  The final discussion addresses the nature of the choice 
behavior of reflexive economic agents, using the thinking of Amartya Sen and Herbert Simon 
to frame how agents might approach choice in regard to each of the two different parts of 
cumulative causal processes, and closing with brief comments on behavioral economics’ 
understanding of reference dependence and position adjustment. 
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1.  Introduction 
Among Geoff Hodgson’s many valuable contributions to institutionalist, evolutionary, and 
heterodox economics is his often-cited critique of methodological individualism.  His own 
conception of individuals, which emphasizes the relations between individuals, and rejects 
the conventional atomistic individual interpretation, essentially represents individuals as 
evolving sets of habits, as reflects his commitment to Veblenian thinking and heterodox 
agency-structure reasoning.  This paper draws on this critique and his evolving habit 
conception of individuals to lay out an account of what individuals must be in evolutionary 
settings that are explained in Veblenian cumulative causation terms.  I characterize such 
agents as reflexive economic agents.  The paper contrasts this type of agent with the standard 
expected utility agent conception, and argues that in a cumulative causation world the 
standard conception fails to explain choice behavior, its principle goal, whereas reflexive 
agent conceptions offers an adequate explanation of choice behavior appropriate to evolving 
worlds.   
 
The second section of the paper discusses Hodgson’s critique of methodological 
individualism, shows its links to his Veblenian thinking, and then shows how his evolving 
habit conception of individuals is one type of reflexive agent conception.  The third section 
discusses Veblen’s cumulative causation view, and emphasizes how it depends on 
understanding economic agents as reflexive.  To make this argument, I set out an account of 
cumulative causation processes which models them as a two-part causal process, one part of 
which involves a linear causal relation and one part which involves a circular causal relation.  
The fourth section discusses the standard expected utility account of economic agents’ choice 
behavior, and argues that on a cumulative causation view of the world the completeness 
assumption that is essential to the standard view of rationality cannot be applied.  The fifth 
section turns to the choice behavior of reflexive economic agents, and briefly uses the 
thinking of Amartya Sen and Herbert Simon to frame how agents might approach choice in 
regard to each of the two different parts of cumulative causal processes.  I argue that in their 
choices agents act directly on the linear part of these causal processes and also insure 
themselves in regard to the circular parts of these causal processes.  In the sixth section, using 
behavioral economics’ emphasis on reference-dependence, an interpretation of this two-part 
analysis of choice is provided in terms of the idea of position adjustment.  In the seventh and 
last section, I conclude by commenting briefly on how this idea can be understood in identity 
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terms to give an ontological characterization of the reflexive agent conception employed in a 
Veblenian, structure-agency framework. 
 
2.  Hodgson on methodological individualism 
Hodgson’s (2007) examination and critique of methodological individualism makes the 
simple but generally neglected point that the meaning of the term has never been precisely 
stated, and the idea is in fact ambiguous as to what it refers to.  Does it refer to explanations 
that are made in terms of individuals alone, or does it refer to explanations that are made in 
terms of individuals plus relations between them?  He argues that while proponents of 
methodological individualism clearly intend the term to refer to explanations in terms of 
individuals alone, in his view explanations in terms of individuals alone have never been 
successfully achieved, always leaving “a social and relational residual that is not reduced 
entirely to individual terms” (Ibid., p. 224n). However, explanations in terms of individuals 
plus the relations between them are also explanations in terms of institutions and social 
structures.   Why, then, should methodological individualist explanations even emphasize 
individuals in the exclusivist way they do.  Indeed, why shouldn’t a ‘methodological 
institutionalism’ emphasizing institutions and social structures be equally plausible 
methodological strategy?  
Yet despite his commitment to institutionalist argument in economics, Hodgson instead 
follows Veblen in rejecting the idea that either individuals or institutions and social 
structures provide self-sufficient foundations for social science (Hodgson, 1998a).  He argues 
that Veblen, in developing an evolutionary framework, insisted that both agency and 
structure are essential to social science explanation since his strategy was “to conceive of 
both agency and structure as a result of an evolutionary process” (p. 423).  However, Hodgson 
also notes that Veblen never fully worked out this strategy with respect to agents and 
individuals.  “While Veblen consistently regarded the human agent as purposeful, he never 
reconciled the notion of purposeful behaviour with mechanical causality” (p. 423n).  Indeed, 
without even getting into what causality involves, if methodologically individuals are to be 
understood in terms of the relations between them, two problems arise.  First, it is unclear 
how individuals understood in terms of the relations between them should even be thought 
to be relatively independent, and second, it is unclear why in an evolutionary world in which 
social relations continually change their individuality, if it can be explained, has any 
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enduringness or ontological stability.1   Hodgson’s way of addressing the first issue, why 
agents should even be thought to be relatively independent, follows Veblen in emphasizing 
the importance of habit explained as an acquired disposition:  “habits affect our choices, and 
our past choices affect habits” (Hodgson, 2010, p. 1).  That is, agents, whether individuals 
(also collections of individuals I would argue) acquire habits, or ways of acting in specific 
types of circumstances, and are consequently disposed to act as agents able to initiate events 
in accord with those habits when the appropriate circumstances re-occur.  Thus agents are 
defined as sets of habits and a capacity to act on those habits.  It follows, I suggest, that since 
agents differ in regard to the sets of habits they each have, they can then be seen as relatively 
independent, as required in an evolutionary agency-structure analysis.  In effect, agents are 
defined as distinguishable sets of habits.  
One thing that is especially valuable about this view – very much in keeping with Veblen’s 
thinking – is its rejection of the subjectivist basis for defining individuals that the mainstream 
employs.  Individuals are not separate collections of preferences (or desires for Veblen), a 
type of psychological phenomenon, but are rather distinguishable collections of a type of 
observable, objective phenomenon, namely, agents’ different habitual ways of acting in the 
world.  In fact, subjectivist conceptions of individuals, whether preferences or any other kinds 
of subjective characteristics, all employ circular explanations of individuality.  In order for a 
set of preferences or some other set of subjective characteristics to pick out and individuate 
a single person, since that set obviously cannot refer to the preferences or subjective 
characteristics of other individuals, it can only refer to preferences that belong to the person 
to be individuated as a separate person.  But it is circular and empty to say that what makes 
a person an individual is that they have only their own characteristics (cf. Davis, 2011, p.  8-
9).  In contrast, with objectivist individual conceptions such as Hodgson’s habit conception, 
we survey the world, see that different sets of habits are clustered in different locations in the 
world, and then impute individual agency to those different habit clusters.  There is nothing 
circular in this procedure.  It has the virtue that it does not presuppose agents’ individuality 
in order to ‘explain’ it but rather infers their individuality from what can be observed and 
explained in terms of how the world is organized – a ‘bottom-up’ a posteriori procedure 
                                                        
1 These two issues correspond to the two identity criteria for conceptions of individuals that I have 
previously employed: individuation and re-identification (Davis, 2011). 
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rather than ‘top-down’ a priori definitional procedure.2 
The second issue regarding agency raised by Hodgson and Veblen’s view that “both agency 
and structure [are the] result of an evolutionary process” is of the ontological stability of 
agents.  If individuals are distinguishable at any one time in virtue of their having different 
sets of habits, but their habits change over time, then it is unclear why they should be thought 
to be distinguishable agents in an enduring sense.  This problem puts the entire agency-
structure approach at risk, since agency would then seem to play an insignificant role in 
agency-structure interaction understood as a process – a concern that Hodgson notes was 
expressed in “Veblen's critique of Marxism … prompted by its apparent over-emphasis on the 
structural determination of individual agency” (Ibid.).  Intuitively speaking, the problem is 
that if agents are to have persistent effects on social structures, they themselves would need 
to persist in some manner, even while continually changing in their habits.  Hodgson’s view, 
however, that individuals and other kinds of agents are sets of habits captures only part of 
what he sees as being involved in how people develop habits, and the further content of the 
idea tells us something about the ontological stability of agents.  Thus, to say that our “habits 
affect our choices, and our past choices affect [our] habits” also makes evolutionary change 
directional and cumulative, as Veblen had emphasized.  Agents’ different sets of habits, then, 
change in a path-dependent and somehow cumulative way, and this tells us that somehow 
agents also exhibit some kind of enduringness.   Agents, accordingly, are not only defined as 
distinguishable sets of habits; they are also defined as distinguishable sets of habits that 
evolve in a cumulative manner.  I see this idea as essential to an evolutionary conception of 
agents, which differs from mainstream subjectivist agent conceptions not only as objectivist 
but also in making as evolutionary change central to the very idea of what an agent is. 
However, the idea of agents as sets of distinguishable, cumulatively evolving sets of habits 
requires considerable unpacking if it is to be clear in meaning and be useful in agency-
structure explanations.  How, then, are we to explain how agents’ different sets of habits 
change in a path-dependent and cumulative way?  I assume this requires we explain the 
                                                        
2 In my recent discussion of the circularity problem for subjectivist individual conceptions, I describe 
another example of successful, non-subjectivist individuation of agents in Ronald Coase’s treatment of 
firms as distinguishable sets of objectively observable real world phenomena, namely, different sets of 
non-market exchanges (Davis, 2011, p. 9).  Two other objectivist individual conceptions I have 
discussed on other occasions are individuals as collections of capabilities (Davis, 2009) and individuals 
as collections of social identities (Davis, 2015b). 
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reflexive feedback process associated with action and habit formation which operates 
roughly as follows: how agents act affects their habit formation, which then feeds back on and 
affects how they subsequently act, which then feeds back on and affects their future habit 
formation, and so on and so on, such that agents’ distinguishable sets of habits evolve in a 
path-dependent, cumulative manner.  In this regard, a reflexive feedback process involving 
agents is a special type of causal process in which agents co-evolve as distinguishable, 
changing sets of habits together with cumulative change in social structures and institutions.  
I characterize this as one type of evolutionary agent conception, and in the following section 
discuss what a cumulative causation process involves in a Veblenian framework in order to 
explain how evolutionary agents are reflexive agents.  
 
3.  Veblen’s cumulative causation view and reflexive agents 
In what way, then, are causal processes cumulative, or how can they be explained as building 
on themselves in a truly evolutionary way in which new causal relationship emerge from past 
ones?  If we first think of causation solely in terms of individual causal sequences, the idea 
that a series of individual causal sequences can build on one another initially seems 
paradoxical.  On the one hand it means that a given cause-and-effect sequence at any one 
point in time is somehow derived from an earlier, related cause-and-effect sequence, yet on 
the other hand it implies that the later cause-and-effect sequence is also different from the 
earlier one.  That is, the cumulative causation idea somehow combines the concepts of 
continuity and non-identity of cause-and-effect sequences (cf. Davis, 2015a).  How can this 
be understood?  I argue this is where the agency side of agency-structure explanations is 
important since the action-habit characterization of agents that Hodgson employs provides a 
way of combining the continuity and non-identity of earlier and later causal sequences in 
such a way as to show how a series of individual causal processes can be seen to be 
cumulative.  Let me be more specific, then, about what that this action-habit link involves. 
For Hodgson, people’s habits dispose them to act in certain ways, or their habits have causal 
effects on their actions, and then in a circular way their actions also influence their habits.  
That is, the disposition to act based on habit, an individual, linear cause-to-effect relationship, 
is coupled with a further effect that somehow revises habit as a basis for future action.  Often 
the modeling of causal processes neglects this further, circular part of this process.  In the 
basic linear representations of the causal relationship, some factor a acts on some other 
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factor b, or a -> b.  But in the case of agents acting on the basis of habits, a circularity operates 
whereby the action of a on b also involves the causal relationship a -> b acting on itself.  Given 
the event a and the a -> b causal relation, it is then also the case that a -> b -> (a -> b).  The 
combined overall effects (=>), then, produce both b and (a -> b)’:  
a and a ->  b and  a -> b ->  (a -> b)’ => b and (a -> b)’. [1] 
The circular character of the process, then, specifically derives from the fact that the linear 
causal relation a -> b has causal effects on itself, which are additional to the linear effects that 
a has on b.  The standard linear causal relationship that operates at the level of individual 
factors, that is, is connected to a further causal process that operates at the level of the causal 
relation itself.  
From this perspective, it is not paradoxical to say in cases such as the habit-action model that 
cumulative causation processes combine continuity and non-identity of linear cause-and-
effect sequences.  Their non-identity is associated with the linear sequence part of the overall 
relation:  
a and a -> b => b  [2] 
since there is nothing in this relation which refers to a changed (a -> b)’.  Their continuity is 
associated with that part of the overall relation in which the linear sequence operates on 
itself:  
a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b)’ => (a -> b)’  [3] 
since here the (a -> b)’ outcome is a result of a -> b acting on itself.  The full overall relation 
[1] combines [2] and [3], and thus shows how the a -> b relation builds on itself.3  
                                                        
3 Note that the flip side of this is that neither are the ideas of novelty and emergence paradoxical ideas, 
as might be argued it they are explained solely in terms of linear causation or on an ex nihilo basis 
(something out of nothing).  Rather emergent and novel properties, (a -> b)’, derive in a circular way 
from known properties, a -> b when the effects of relationships on themselves are taken into account.  
They only appear to lack a basis in past relationships, or appear to originate ex nihilo, when (a -> b)’ is 
mistakenly derived only from the simple linear action of a on b, giving the false impression that (a -> 
b)’ has somehow mysteriously emerged in a direct, unmediated way from the causal relationship at 
the level of individual factors.  I call this the ex nihilo fallacy in causal theory. 
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Consider agents then.  Agents are disposed to act on the basis of their habits, so their habits 
work as causal factors influencing their actions as effects.  This is the linear causal 
relationship operating at the level of individual factors.  But their actions change the way in 
which their habits operate on their actions.  This is the circular part of the overall causal 
process in which the habit-action causal relation acts on itself.  In effect, then, the linear 
relationship is embedded in the overall relationship.  From this perspective, we can 
understand why Veblen’s emphasis on purpose in explaining agent behavior only goes part 
of the way toward explaining the nature of cumulative causation.  Purpose, as a way of saying 
how action stems from habit, only describes the linear relationship in which a acts on b, or a 
-> b, and leaves out the circular reflexive feedback effects of how the a -> b relation acts on 
itself, or how a -> b produces (a -> b)’.  That is, there is no account of how the agent’s exercise 
of purpose is itself affected by its exercise. 
I characterize the overall combination of linear and circular effects as a feedback relation.  
Often feedback is associated with a clearly reflexive sequence such as a -> b -> a.  But this 
representation is an inadequate characterization of reflexivity, because a -> b -> a does not 
show that a has changed, which is the actual idea with feedback.  In contrast, it is not 
unreasonable to say that the a -> b relation acts on itself, as when the exercise of the habit-
action relation is said to act on itself.  Indeed, reflexive relationships have long been explained 
as exhibiting a property called self-referentiality, or the idea of something ‘reflecting or 
bending back upon itself’ (cf. Sandri, 2009, pp. 6-8).  Self-referentiality is perhaps more widely 
associated with semantics, e.g., the liar’s paradox (Beal and Glanzberg, 2014), and with 
mathematics, e.g., Russell’s set theory paradox, (Bolander, 2013), but it also plays an 
important role in the analysis of certain types of causal processes, particularly in connection 
with positive feedback relationships (e.g., Soros, 2013).  Further, evolutionary explanations 
in the social sciences such as in the action-habit relationship parallel some evolutionary 
explanations in biology in which two-part causal processes have both individual effects and 
overall effects on the domain in which the process operates, such as the in analysis of causal 
relationships in ecosystems (cf. Huneman, 2014a and 2014b).   
This all then also points toward another way in which the evolutionary habits conception of 
agents is superior to the mainstream subjectivist conception.  The habits conception works 
through feedback effects from action onto habits, which then determines the basis for future 
action.  The subjectivist preference conception rules out feedback effects from action onto its 
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subjectivist basis because its treats the subjectivist basis for action as exogenous and 
unchanging.  So the causal process it involves can be neither circular nor self-referential.  That 
is, it represents the causal process in a purely linear manner – a subjective factor a, the agent’s 
preference, acts on a factor b, the agent’s choice of action.  This representation of causality 
may sometimes be useful as a rough approximation of choice behavior in a limited temporal 
frame, but becomes problematic for through-time characterizations of agent behavior.  Part 
of the meaning of being an agent of course is of something that brings about change in 
something else.  But a deeper agent conception – a reflexive agent conception – is the idea of 
an agent that brings about change by acting on something else and also acting on itself.  In 
effect, then, the mainstream subjectivist agent conception models causal processes too 
narrowly, and fails to capture the circular, cumulative nature of social science processes that 
a reflexive agent conception can explain. 
What I turn to in the next two sections, then, is the choice behavior of economic agents.  My 
goal is to explain the nature of reflexive economic agents by comparison with the standard 
account of agents’ choice behavior.  The main difference concerns how reflexive agents form 
expectations about the future and anticipate the consequences of their actions.  Since they 
can see that the consequences of their actions affect not only what their actions directly affect 
but also the action-target relationship they act on, they must be seen as operating with a 
cumulative causation model of the world, not the linear causation model that subjectivist 
agent conceptions employ.  In effect, not only do reflexive agents target the effects of their 
actions but they also target the effects of their actions on their action-target strategies.  First, 
however, consider what the standard account of choice behavior of economic agents involves. 
 
4.  The standard account of choice behavior and the completeness assumption 
The standard subjectivist choice model, or the expected utility model, assumes that the 
agent’s choice set, or the objects over which the agent chooses, is complete in the sense that 
all those objects are commensurable, or can be evaluated according to a common metric, so 
that the agent always prefers one object to another or is indifferent between them.  However, 
if the choice set is incomplete, or not all the objects the agent encounters are comparable, 
then standard optimization analysis of choice fails (Sen, 1997).  I argue, then, that on a 
Veblenian habit-action view, in which choice is understood in cumulative causation terms, 
agents’ choice sets must be incomplete, and the standard choice model fails. 
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Following the discussion of the last section, consider how choice understood in cumulative 
causation terms would be modeled.  First, given a set of prices and the agent’s income, the 
agent’s preference, a, acts causally on the object of the agent’s choice, b, where b is in one 
possible object in the agent’s choice set: 
 
a and a -> b => b.  [2] 
Here [2] represents the linear part of the overall causal relationship as set out above.  Second, 
what [2] disregards is the circular part of this overall relationship whereby a -> b acts on 
itself, or: 
 
a -> b and a -> b ->  (a -> b)’ => (a -> b)’.  [3] 
 
Combining [2] and [3] gives the overall causal effect of the agent’s preference on the expected 
object of choice: 
 
a and a ->  b and  a -> b ->  (a -> b)’ => b and (a -> b)’.   [1] 
Here I suppose that (a -> b)’ = a -> b’ in order to capture the change in the relationship.  Note, 
then, that the b’s on the right sides of expressions [2] and [1] are actually different objects of 
choice which differ according to whether the circular effects from [3] are included.  So both 
b’s must be in the agent’s choice set.  Supposing that agents consider these circular effects, 
they must consequently compare the b in [2] with the b’ in [3] in terms of some common 
metric.  However, the b in [2] in the a -> b relationship cannot be compared with the b’ as in 
[3] in the a -> b’ relationship, because when the circular affects operate, that latter 
relationship replaces the former one.  That is, when a -> b’ obtains, we are in a different causal 
world than when a -> b obtains.  Consequently these two b objects do not share a common 
metric, and thus the agent’s choice set is incomplete. 
It is important to be clear, then, about the basis for the completeness assumption and the 
meaning of comparability in the standard view.  If a folk psychology understanding of choice 
is adopted, one might suppose that comparability is a matter of some human evaluative 
ability.  If the agent believes two objects can be compared, then they can be.  But this is a 
mistaken interpretation of the completeness assumption.  Axiomatic rational choice theory 
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is rather formulated in set-theoretic terms, so that in regard to the completeness assumption 
when any two objects are compared, they must be members of a single set of objects.  
Moreover, that set of objects has its unity in virtue of there being at a given point in time one 
set of causal relationships which governs those objects.  Comparability, that is, is not 
understood psychologically or perceptually in the sense of an agent’s human ability or even 
willingness to compare any two random objects.  Rather on the set-theoretic view of rational 
choice the agent can only compare objects that are defined to be members of the same set.  
Thus human abilities for comparing the objects of choice are irrelevant.  Accordingly, on set-
theoretic grounds, comparability fails in the case of expression [3].  Thus the completeness 
assumption and the standard view of choice cannot be used in cumulative causation 
explanations.4   
5.  The choice behavior of reflexive economic agents 
How, then, are we to explain the choice behavior of reflexive economic agents in a cumulative 
causation world?  A first step is to move from standard optimizing behavior to a more flexible 
characterization of behavior as merely maximizing on the assumption that, though the 
completeness assumption cannot be upheld, we can still represent agents as aiming to do as 
well as they can.  Thus Sen has argued that non-commensurability, which fails for a number 
of reasons, precludes optimizing behavior, understood as requiring one-to-one comparisons 
between all choice options, but does not preclude maximizing behavior, understood as 
allowing comparisons of choice options that are incomplete or partial and yet still transitive 
(Sen, 1997).  Maximizing behavior, that is, aims at ranges of alternatives not worse than all 
other accessible options, whereas optimizing behavior more demandingly aims at 
alternatives that are as good as all other accessible options.   
Sen also likens maximizing behavior understood in this way to Simon’s ‘satisficing’ behavior 
(Simon, 1982).  Both Sen and Simon, it should be noted, have employed reflexive agent type 
conceptions not unlike Hodgson’s action-habit model whereby agents not only make choices 
but also evaluate the basis on which they make choices.  Sen explains this in terms of his 
“fourth aspect of the self” involving how agents examine their “own values and objectives and 
                                                        
4 It is also worth noting that the folk psychological interpretation of completeness is virtually empty 
of meaning in that this idea of comparability is so open-ended that there is likely no definitive way to 
determine whether any two objects can be compared in terms of some common metric.  In effect, the 
folk psychological view is biased towards always assuming comparability.  This is one reason in favor 
of the more rigorous set-theoretic approach.    
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choose in the light of those values and objectives” (Sen, 2002, p. 36).  Simon explains this in 
terms of his ‘ecological rationality’ thinking whereby behavior is “shaped by a scissors whose 
two blades are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the 
actor” (Simon 1990, p. 7), such that agents continually need to account for the environmental 
circumstances of choice.5  If we then interpret Sen and Simon’s views along the lines of the 
cumulative causation account of choice above, we can ascribe the reflexive aspect of behavior 
they emphasize to the circular part of the overall representation of cumulative causal 
processes, namely to [3].  That is, when agents make choices, they are not only concerned 
with their immediate object of choice but also with the choice-object relationship itself.   
But how is this to be explained?  As a first step, we can distinguish [2] and [3] in terms of their 
differing degrees of likelihood for the agent.  The linear relation [2], then, presumably has a 
higher degree of probability that the circular relation [3].  That is, it seems fair to suppose 
that the exercise of the agent’s preference, a, is more likely to bring about the object of the 
agent’s choice, b, than is the action of a -> b on itself likely to bring about a change in that 
relationship and produce a (a -> b)’.  Among the reasons to think this is the evidence from 
science that a -> b causal relations are relatively stable and evolve (when they do) slowly.  
Indeed without this sort of stability, science would be very difficult and less successful than 
it has been.  I accordingly hypothesize that direct linear relations are more likely than indirect 
circular ones.6  
I also hypothesize, then, that agents generally know this.  At the same time, as reflexive agents 
they still know that their actions can have effects on their basis for action, or action can affect 
habit in the action-habit model, even if their main concern is the immediate effects of choice 
and action, or how acting on the basis of habit generates reliable outcomes.  This shifts the 
issue to how agents integrate two different concerns in their choice behavior.  In the section 
that follows, I address this issue in terms of two different ways that agents order and manage 
uncertainty, and characterize the overall behavior of reflexive economic agents in 
position/adjustment terms.  
                                                        
5 The ‘ecological rationality’ label has been attributed to Simon by others: “A [decision] heuristic is 
ecologically rational to the degree that it is adapted to the structure of the environment” (Gigerenzer 
et al 1999, p. 13).   
6 How much less likely the circular relation is presumably depends on agent interaction and the extent 
to which agents together re-evaluate the basis on which they act, as in herding behaviors. 
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6.  Managing uncertainty: Position/adjustment behavior 
One way to approach this issue is in terms of how people have addressed an especially 
important unexpected event in the recent past.  Thus, a key lesson from the 2007-2008 
financial crisis was that rare events with significant undesirable consequences require 
strategies different in kind from common events with more modest undesirable 
consequences.  Common events with more modest undesirable consequences are costly but 
are not catastrophic in the sense developed by Roy Radner (1997) that they may put the 
survival of the agent at risk.7  Why purportedly rare events such as the 2007-2008 crisis occur 
more frequently than predicted, of course, has been subject to considerable debate, but one 
reason this can happen is that causal relationships may change as a result of what agents do, 
as in [3], so that what was previously rare in fact no longer is.8  How, then, would agents 
address this possibility?  Radner draws an important conclusion.  He argues that when 
economic survival is the pre-eminent concern of the agent, standard utility optimization 
analysis is inadequate and must be set aside.  Consequently, even though circumstances that 
put agents at extreme risk are not common, we may imagine that agents nonetheless 
prioritize addressing them, and then proceed to adjust their ordinary decision-making to 
these prior choices. 
 
In effect, agents first insure themselves against catastrophic events that may have 
consequences for their survival.  The idea of ‘survival’ can of course be taken different ways, 
but here is simply understood to refer to agents’ ability to maintain themselves as agents.  In 
behavioral economic terms, they are ‘reference-dependent’ in that they aim to maintain 
whatever positions they occupy, and “the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, 
rather than final states” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 277).  It follows that “losses loom 
larger than gains” (Ibid., p. 279), or agents’ value functions are increasing in losses and 
diminishing in gains.  In effect, following Simon, agents behave homeostatically, always acting 
reflexively to return themselves to a prior state, especially when they are in danger of losing 
ground and have modest interest in moving away from that state when there is the 
                                                        
7 Radner analyzes the classic ‘gambler’s ruin problem’ first investigated by Blaise Pascal and James 
Bernoulli.  Vernon Smith uses Radner’s thinking regarding economic survival to develop his own views 
of ecological rationality (Smith, 2007, pp. 169ff).   
8 Another reason that puts aside the issue of change in causal relationships is that events are not 
normally distributed so that there are ‘fat tails.’ 
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opportunity to do so.  On this position/adjustment view, that is, agents are first and foremost 
reflexive agents.   
Note, then, that agents’ positions are only at risk in a cumulative causation world when their 
actions (together with the actions of others) have some probability of changing the causal 
relations they act on, as in [3].  Accordingly, as argued above, the standard completeness 
assumption fails, and their reference-dependent behavior cannot be explained in standard 
optimization terms.  However, following Sen’s arguments about non-commensurability and 
maximization, reflexive agents can aim to do the best they can, making comparisons of choice 
options that are incomplete or partial and yet still transitive.  We might consequently say that 
reflexive agents are not just position/adjustment agents, but position/adjustment-
minimizing agents, with minimizing replacing maximizing when agents are reference-
dependent, or rather position-dependent.  
This understanding, then, places a particular emphasis on Hodgson’s evolving habits 
conception of agents.  Hodgson’s view is that the habit-action causal link feeds back on itself 
and influences the habits on which agents act.  What the analysis of behavior above adds to 
this view with its emphasis on agents seeking to maintain their positions is an underlying 
inertia in how agents’ habits evolve, as indeed is appropriate to a habits conception.  As 
adjustment minimizing, agents are biased toward relying on the positions and habits they 
have.  That is, the greater probability of the main habit-action causal relation, or [2], bulks 
larger in their world, though they remain reflexive agents aware of the further possibility that 
their actions will alter their habits. 
7.  Concluding comment on identity  
Ontologically speaking, reflexive agents in a Veblenian, structure-agency framework must be 
distinguishable and re-identifiable to count as enduring individual agents.  I suggest, then, 
that both properties can be ascribed to such agents in connection with their nature as 
reflexive.  Essentially, when agents act with an awareness of how their actions influence the 
basis on which they act, they distinguish themselves for themselves as individual agents.  That 
is, reflexive behavior is self-individuating.  At the same time, whether this is a property or 
indeed an enduring property of agents is contingent upon its exercise.  Should agents largely 
conceive of the world as in [2], then they fail to be independent agents in real terms, where 
this is a matter of how the world works causally. 
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Neoclassical agents, of course, necessarily act according to [2] because what motivates their 
choices are given preferences which are by definition unaffected by their actions.  Above I 
argued that the preference conception (and any subjective conception) of agents is circular 
since the basis for individuality – own preferences – presupposes individuality.  In contrast, 
in a reflexive agent conception what agents’ actions are and what they do determines their 
individuality.  Self-reference, then, is not just a semantic or mathematical relationship.  It is a 
real world relationship exhibited causally in human action, and individuality is thus a matter 
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